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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 18, 1982

Executive Registry

82-13570

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Latest papers on the Soviet Union

Attached are the latest versions of the Department of State papers on the Soviet Union: "The View from Washington", and "U. S. Policy: Possible Actions/Initiatives".

Charles Hill
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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State Dept. review completed

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December 18, 1982

Task III

THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTONI. Overview

The general goals of U.S. foreign policy are: to create an international environment where U.S. interests are secure; to manage U.S. foreign relations so as to protect and support the domestic economic recovery and rearmament effort needed to conduct a sound foreign policy; to restore the sense and the reality of American strength and leadership in world affairs after a decade of doubt and uncertainty; and to build a strong domestic consensus for an internationalist foreign policy approach with these objectives.

To achieve these goals we need to compete effectively with the Soviet Union. The USSR is and will remain the most serious threat and obstacle to our interests, our values and the international environment we seek. It is and will remain a formidable adversary, and only an occasional partner. Despite domestic weaknesses of its own, the Soviet Union is now acting as if the basic forces of history were moving in its favor. Through its own military buildup and through political, military and diplomatic activism, it seeks to promote a shift in the "world correlation of forces" against U.S. interests.

Current U.S. Policy: This Administration seeks over the next 5-10 years to contain and reverse Soviet expansionism, to promote the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a pluralistic political and economic system, and to engage the USSR in negotiations aimed at reaching agreements that protect and enhance U.S. interests and are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. Our immediate objective has been to induce restraint in Soviet behavior, through policies which raise the costs to Moscow for irresponsible Soviet behavior and put us in a position better to defend U.S. interests insofar as we do not achieve improved Soviet behavior.

Our strategy for accomplishing this objective has been to establish an agenda of priority U.S. concerns which focuses on the real causes of international instability, and which sets high standards of improved Soviet behavior as the prerequisite to more constructive relations with us, our Allies and our friends. To this end, we seek to maintain pressure on Soviet performance through a wide variety of means: our rearmament

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program; strengthening our alliances and friendships; efforts to resolve regional problems in ways that protect our interests and deny the Soviets opportunities and advantages; and direct dealings with the USSR.

The Soviet Response: Over the past two years, this approach has had mixed results. On one hand, as in Poland and Central America, the Soviets and their proxies have continued to score, and overall, we have witnessed neither a general Soviet retreat from the new positions acquired over the past decade, nor even Soviet recognition that new restraint is called for, as a matter of policy. On the other hand, there has been no major Soviet victory at our expense or major new instance of Soviet misconduct of the kind that marked nearly every year of the 1975-1980 period, and the Soviets may have forgone some opportunities in various crisis areas. Some measure of this apparent increase in Soviet cautiousness can be attributed to our tough new approach.

Outlook: Looking ahead toward the next two years, neither U.S. policies nor domestic economic stringencies are likely viewed by Soviet leaders as compelling them toward either broad retrenchment or stepped-up aggressiveness in their foreign activities. The probability of really radical changes in the substance of Soviet policies across the board is not high. It thus appears most likely that the USSR will continue to pursue an active diplomacy within a basically unaltered policy framework. But they are feeling somewhat greater pressures than two years ago. Therefore, somewhat greater activism in the presentational side of Soviet policy is likely, and it could extend to substance in ways both dangerous for and helpful to our interests.

The Soviet objective will be to push us off our current course and reestablish the agenda on Soviet terms by an opportunistic combination of threats and blandishments which minimize substantive Soviet concessions and serve to isolate the U.S. by: (1) dividing us from our Allies and friends; (2) making moves in which the U.S. is not involved; and/or (3) demanding "ready and positive responses" to moves that do not go to the heart of U.S. and Western concerns but can nevertheless be advertised as "contributions to lessening tensions."

U.S. Objectives in the Near Term: Since we cannot expect to force a general Soviet retreat in the next two years, U.S. objectives should be both to seize opportunities for substantial progress on a selected number of the priority issues we have identified, and to counter Soviet initiatives in areas where collaboration is impossible. Specifically, our goals should be:

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- (1) to preempt and/or counter new Soviet threats against Allies and friends, e.g. in Europe in connection with INF deployments, or new encroachments (Somalia, Central America);
- (2) to offset Soviet efforts to undermine support for our overall approach to East-West relations by "peace offensives" vis-a-vis China, Japan, and Western Europe where the INF issue will once again be central;
- (3) to maintain the initiative we, our Allies and friends have gained on regional problems, e.g. Afghanistan and Kampuchea, by proving that the Soviets cannot achieve genuine settlements without us; and
- (4) to advance the process of restructuring East-West economic relations in order to limit the free ride the Soviets now get through subsidized credit and easy access to Western advanced technology, and to minimize opportunities for them to use trade to divide the West;
- (5) to induce Soviet acquiescence or active cooperation where possible to achieve genuine solutions, e.g. southern Africa, non-proliferation, and perhaps INF or START.

If we have been too conservative in our assumptions, and the Soviets embark on either a new burst of expansionism or a general retrenchment, we will naturally need to adjust these goals and our policies for pursuing them. At this point, however, we judge that the USSR is likely to present much the same challenges it does today. But they are likely to be both more active and more skillful.

Precisely because the kinds of Soviet moves we should anticipate will not be radical departures but rather adjustments in Soviet behavior within its current framework, we must plan to work in a difficult gray area. Our task will be to keep the Soviets moving over the border between shadow and substance, by our own efforts and together with our Allies and friends. Working with them, we have it in our power to pursue our own objectives; to ensure it is recognized that positive Soviet moves are in fact responses to the tough new American approach; and to make the kinds of moves likely to ensure further progress toward genuine solutions to the issues on our agenda.

A strategy of American activism, momentum and strength does not define the content of our policy in each area. For example,

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we do not need to rush to a summit just to demonstrate activism. Nor should we change policies for the sake of "doing something." Clearly, our approach will depend in part on the situation in each area. Where there are opportunities for advancing our interests, or where Soviet action already calls for a response, we should move now to keep or regain the initiative. In other areas we can afford to await developments.

In general, however, we should be acutely aware that the Soviets, like us, have the opportunities and the power to move in various directions, and that if we are to make our policy toward the Soviet Union a success we will need action and initiative both in shaping the USSR's external environment and in the US-Soviet relationship. We will need disincentives and incentives, a willingness to penalize misconduct and to stimulate positive steps. Some suggestions are identified in the next section of this study. Here we examine the situations on the individual items of the US-Soviet agenda to provide a basis for judging where action is, and is not, likely to be needed.

II. The Agenda

A. Regional Issues

In our direct dealings with the Soviets we have made clear our general concern with the pattern of Soviet conduct in the various regions of East-West engagement, and our specific concerns with regard to Poland, Afghanistan, southern Africa, Central America/ the Caribbean and Kampuchea. They have agreed to discuss our agenda of regional concerns, and in two cases -- Afghanistan and southern Africa -- we have conducted more detailed exchanges at sub-ministerial level. But there is still uncertainty in Moscow as to how far the U.S. is prepared to respond even if the Soviets move in serious and substantial ways. Resolution of these issues on a basis that advances our interests will not depend primarily on US-Soviet bilateral discussion, but on how the specific regional situations evolve. At the same time, the US-Soviet dimension needs to be incorporated as one factor in each situation.

In reviewing U.S. interests and leverage on regional issues, it is natural to begin with an area where new Soviet activism met with a local response even before Brezhnev's death: the Sino-Soviet negotiating process. A Soviet policy approach designed to isolate the U.S. could well begin in Asia.

1. Improvement in Sino-Soviet Relations: Our interest is to retain maximum flexibility to pursue our basic interests in relations with both countries, without appearing to be pressured by what transpires between them; to see that the degree of

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improvement in Sino-Soviet relations achieved does not damage regional stability or U.S. alliances and friendships in the area; and to ensure that any approaches to area problems which may emerge from Sino-Soviet discussions (such as on Kampuchea) do not stop short of addressing the real causes of instability we have defined.

For historical, geographic and political reasons, there are severe limits on how much progress the Soviets and Chinese can make in their negotiations. A modest relaxation in Sino-Soviet tensions need not damage U.S. interests, provided we do not overreact in our own dealings with Beijing and provided we give neither country grounds to believe that the process itself can force adjustments in U.S. policy. However, the further the process goes, the greater the potential damage, particularly if accompanied by further strain in US-Chinese relations. And our own capacity to shape outcomes in Sino-Soviet relations is also limited.

Vis-a-vis the Soviets, our principal objectives are to minimize the leverage over us they gain from unfreezing the Sino-Soviet axis of the triangle, and to minimize the new pressure they can exert on U.S. Allies and friends (Japan, Western Europe, Pakistan) by redeployment of forces that might be reduced in the context of a Sino-Soviet understanding. Our leverage on Sino-Soviet relations is primarily with China, not the USSR. This means strengthening the Sino-American bilateral relationship where we can and renewing our dialogue with the Chinese on strategic topics of common interest, while managing our unofficial relations with Taiwan with care.

2. Japan: Japanese attachment to the U.S. security tie is unlikely to be called in question by any foreseeable Soviet move. Only actual return of the two islands ("Northern Territories") the Soviets offered in 1955 would cause a major shift in the Japanese position, and the Soviets have given no recent indication of a willingness even to discuss the territorial issue. But there could be some movement on the margins toward less hostile Japanese-Soviet relations if overly positive atmospherics and/or movement in US-Soviet relations made the Japanese feel left behind. There is also some Japanese nervousness about the implications of the Sino-Soviet negotiating process, and if it advanced far enough to raise doubts about U.S. competence in Japan, the Japanese might be less inclined to follow the U.S. lead on Asian policies, particularly where China is a factor.

Hence, our interests with regard to the Soviet/Japanese equation are: to see Sino-Soviet reconciliation limited, and keep maximum U.S. influence on the process; and to see the

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Japanese develop a broader view of Japan's interests and focus Japanese attention on the security issues which unite us, alongside the trade and defense burden-sharing issues which divide us.

3. Kampuchea: Our interest in both regional and US-Soviet terms is in total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, leaving an independent, non-aligned Kampuchea. But a partial withdrawal which left Kampuchea under Vietnamese control and deprived our ASEAN friends of the will and/or the means to promote their agreed conditions for regional stability would not be in either U.S. or Chinese interests.

Kampuchea is on the agenda of Sino-Soviet talks, and the Chinese have now presented a proposal for phased total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops in that context. If the Vietnamese undertook a partial withdrawal at Soviet behest (agreeing in principle to total withdrawal) and stopped there, ASEAN could react in two ways. It might feel obliged simply to acquiesce. Alternatively, it could act to sustain its influence on the Kampuchea situation and pressure for total Vietnamese withdrawal.

The legacy of strong U.S. support for ASEAN and inevitable ASEAN fear of a Chinese-Soviet and/or Vietnamese dominance of Southeast Asia give our friends and us powerful leverage to effect the latter outcome. We should maintain our firm support for ASEAN strategy, and continue to stress our bilateral security relationship, particularly with Thailand, while maintaining regular consultations with Beijing. In these contexts continued U.S. support for ASEAN's efforts to strengthen the Kampuchean coalition and its non-communist elements is important.

4. Afghanistan: As in Kampuchea, our interest in both regional and US-Soviet terms is in total withdrawal of Soviet troops and restoration of non-aligned, independent status under a government of the Afghans' choice. But, as in Kampuchea, a Soviet strategy which deprived Pakistan of the will or capacity to resist Soviet control in Afghanistan, which led to partial Soviet withdrawal leaving Soviet control intact and which was achieved without U.S. input, would not be in our interest.

If the Soviets ran true to form, they would advance some combination of sticks and carrots, e.g. increases in troop levels and/or pressure on Pakistan on the one hand, and offers to reduce troop levels, secure recognition of the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier and/or broaden the base of the Afghan "government" on the other. Faced with a carrot-and-stick package that included a Soviet offer to reduce troop levels and perhaps reconfigure the puppet Afghan government in return for

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reductions in Pakistani support for the resistance, our objective would be to ensure that the Pakistanis, rather than the Soviets, controlled the pace of Soviet reductions, and that Pakistani support for the resistance did not cease until a Soviet total withdrawal had been achieved.

Here, too, the political/security relationship we have built with Pakistan provides us powerful leverage, on condition that we keep it in good repair and demonstrate convincingly that we are genuinely committed to seeing the Soviet threat to Pakistani security from Afghanistan removed. By so doing we would develop our bilateral relationship better and ensure both our continued support for the Afghan national resistance and firm Pakistani insistence on total Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. We should consult intensively with the Pakistanis both on ways of advancing political solutions in Afghanistan and on improving coordination among insurgent groups in the country; and we should not hesitate to advance them, or encourage others to do so, if common approaches are agreed.

5. Persian Gulf and the Middle East: These two regions are of course fundamental to our interests, and vis-a-vis the Soviets our interest is to see their role reduced to a minimum, and to prevent them from exploiting their assets in the area to our disadvantage. Their political and diplomatic leverage has been reduced in recent years, but they have a wide variety of covert means to influence critical situations. In particular, they have worrisome capacity -- real and potential -- to undermine area regimes friendly to Western interests.

In the Iran-Iraq war, our interest is to prevent the Soviets from exacerbating the current conflict and to deny them the chance to set the terms for its solution. The larger issues of Iran's role in the area and Soviet influences in Iran and the Gulf states of course dominate the background, and we should pursue the steps we are taking to protect our interests under any outcome. Perhaps no other Third World issue is potentially more dangerous for U.S. interests given the critical importance that security of Gulf oil supplies has for us and our Allies.

On Arab-Israeli issues, our interest is to prevent the Soviets from blocking progress toward solutions. In practical terms they must rely primarily on their Syrian connection and rhetorical efforts to deepen moderate Arab doubts about the U.S. initiative. However, Soviet capacity to influence outcomes on Arab/Israeli issues is limited even assuming our current efforts end in failure, and the Soviets can really hope to make a comeback in Middle East diplomacy only if they do. Hence, while the Soviets can continue to play a modest blocking role in the

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area, their chances of reentering the mainstream of area developments in the next two years are slim. In the case of Iran-Iraq we can work through third parties, and on Arab-Israeli issues we can continue to work through the area parties, to ensure that this remains the case.

6. Ethiopia: On the other side of the vital Red Sea oil route, our interest vis-a-vis the Soviets is in preventing them from exploiting the weakness of the regimes closest to us (Sudan and Somalia), Libyan intrigue, and the overwhelmingly dominant Ethiopian military establishment to topple Siad Barre and/or Nimeiri, thus giving us a geopolitical reverse at little cost or risk to themselves. We also want drawdown and eventual departure of Cuban forces in Ethiopia and eventual reorientation of Ethiopia toward the West. Our leverage lies primarily in our direct relations with the Sudanese and Somalis, continued Ethiopian (and Soviet) uncertainty about the extent of our commitment to these partners, and in our influence with countries, particularly Arab moderates, who support them and/or support resistance to the Ethiopian regime.

7. Southern Africa: Here our primary interest is that the Soviets refrain from obstructing and preventing conclusion of the Namibia/Angola settlement process. The U.S. is held responsible for the success of a complex and difficult diplomatic initiative. The Soviets realize that this initiative is far from exhausted and are nervous that it may succeed, thereby to some extent undercutting their influence in the region. At the same time, they wish to avoid seeing the onus for failure placed on them or on the Cubans, so their opposition must be low-key. We also need to keep in view the Soviets' long-term game: expanding the base for an eventual try at South Africa itself. To this end, they want the SADF out of Namibia.

We have an advantage in that we are at the center of the only process which can produce a genuine settlement, while the Soviets can block but not broker a solution. Moreover, the Soviets know that their long-term interests in the region could be set back somewhat to the extent the Black Africans blame them for failure of the settlement effort. On the other hand, we must realize that some degree of Soviet association will be required if their Cuban surrogates are to cooperate.

We must be realistic about the difficulty we will have in placing the blame for eventual failure on the Soviets and Cubans. Nevertheless, our strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet factor should be geared to this objective, and the key to our leverage lies in convincing the Angolans and other Africans to insist on Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola, and in ensuring that reductions linked to a withdrawal timetable are substantial

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enough to secure SARG cooperation on the total settlement. If this can be achieved, we will be in a position to offer the Soviets some credit in a settlement if they and the Cubans accede, and force them to shoulder the blame if they do not. We also need to continue working with the SARG and Mozambique to reduce the likelihood that Cubans will be asked to defend Mozambique against SARG-inspired attacks.

8. Central America/the Caribbean: Our interest is for the Soviets to stop supporting insurgencies in Central America, building up Cuban power-projection capabilities, and building up Nicaraguan military strength both directly and through Cuba. The most urgent contingency in terms of escalatory potential (and thus of US-Soviet relations overall) is introduction of jet combat aircraft and/or Cuban combat forces into Nicaragua. Further, the Soviets can increase or relieve pressure on us in the region by altering the pace of military supply to Cuba. And in a longer perspective, a combination of economic recession and societal change which the Soviets would exploit would produce dangerous destabilization in countries of profound importance to us, e.g. Mexico. Our leverage consists in our own power position in the area and our relations with its governments and forces, in the first instance; direct leverage in relations with the Soviets and Cubans comes a distant second, but should not be discounted.

9. Eastern Europe: The U.S. interest in Eastern Europe is in evolution toward greater diversity, individual freedom and national autonomy, and respect for human rights and internationally respected norms of behavior, both in external and domestic affairs. The Soviets' interest is in maintaining the maximum degree of control and homogeneity consonant with tranquility and with reduced potential to subsidize the East European economies. There are natural tensions inherent in both approaches: for the Soviets, too much control and homogeneity or too little economic subsidization would threaten tranquility (and thus control); for us, it can be hard to reconcile support for national autonomy, on the one hand, and human rights and individual freedom on the other, as in Romania. Both sides have at their disposal fewer of the economic resources that have been the stuff of competition for influence in the area since 1956; both sides will be obliged to make up the shortfall through political means.

Although they are unlikely to do so in a major way, over the next 6-24 months the Soviets may broaden the limits of their tolerance for economic reform in selected East European countries, beginning with the most urgent, Poland. In Poland itself, economic reform could be part of a "normalization

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process" that is sure to cut both ways in terms of U.S. interests. It will alleviate suffering, and show that Western pressure "works." But it will also reflect greater regime self-confidence, probably keep many fundamental aspects of repression intact, and increase tensions among the Western Allies. In other countries, Soviet motives for tolerating economic adjustment will also be malign: to relieve themselves of some of the economic burden they carry; to consolidate party hegemony through reform before developments reach the Polish flashpoint; and to observe experiments in containing the political consequences of economic reform through greater discipline in non-economic areas, in case they also choose this path.

Our leverage lies in the universal desire of East European populations for more freedom, and of East European governments for more autonomy; in the stubborn attachment of governments and peoples alike to increased contacts with the West; in our sophisticated differentiation policy; and in the extent to which we can muster the economic and political resources to compete for influence in the area. Vis-a-vis the Soviet Union itself, our leverage lies in the Soviet desire to reconcile minimum Western influence on political developments in the area with maximum Western burden-sharing for the costs of maintaining the Soviet security zone there. Our goal must be to turn this equation to our advantage: to extract maximum influence from the limited costs we can and are willing to bear. Hence, issues of U.S. policy in the area will present themselves in the first instance in political/economic form.

10. Western Europe: We are pursuing a large number of specific objectives of very high national importance in Western Europe: implementation of the NATO two-track decision on INF; increased West European defense spending; West European cooperation in shaping and implementing a coherent new policy for East-West economic relations; European willingness to work with us on both bilateral and multilateral trade and financial issues; and substantially enhanced cooperation outside the NATO treaty area, i.e. in the Middle East and southern Africa. Many and ultimately all of these objectives are important to the success of our broad program for managing relations with the USSR. We are in the process of shaping a new, more stringent and more coherent Western consensus for East-West relations post-détente, as a key element in a sounder and more stable environment for the U.S. in world affairs.

The Soviet objective is to stop us, and it is conceivable that the Soviets see in East-West tensions a historic opportunity to achieve a permanent weakening of the Western

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alliance system. The Western rearmament effort will be at a critical stage in 1983, when the INF deployment decision will be implemented; the Soviets must try to prevent implementation in any case, and will try to do so in a way that maximizes strains in the Alliance. Hence, a great deal hinges on the outcome of this political battle.

We and the Soviets see this battle as perhaps the most critical single event of 1983. The U.S. determination to go ahead, and Soviet efforts to prevent us from doing so by using sticks as well as carrots, could produce a significantly higher level of tension. We could see an overall worsening of the bilateral relationship next year from this source alone.

B. Military Security/Arms Control

The U.S. interest is to modernize our military forces and correct shifts against us in the military balance, at the lowest possible level of forces achievable through agreements that protect and enhance U.S. interests. The Soviet objective is to undercut public and political support for this effort here and among our Allies, and to defeat it. Over the next two years, the Soviet leadership under Andropov is likely to make vigorous moves to achieve that objective.

Andropov will need to keep military support for his leadership, and major reductions in Soviet forces are unlikely. However, war fears are infecting West European, Japanese and American politics, so there will be a high premium on parleying modest willingness to adjust force levels downward into showcase negotiating moves designed to undercut Western rearmament. Current Soviet propaganda attacks on MX and INF, together with veiled threats of "launch-on-warning" and counterdeployments may thus be increasingly counterpointed by public arms control "initiatives" designed to paint the Administration as insincere and unwilling to negotiate.

Our leverage lies in sustaining a solid domestic and Alliance consensus in favor of rearmament, while at the same time making a credible case that we are negotiating in good faith in START, INF and other fora.

C. Bilateral Relations

Our objective in bilateral relations, as in other areas, is to induce Soviet restraint and willingness to resolve problems of priority concern to the U.S. Over the next two years, our capacity to shape the Soviet environment indirectly will continue to provide our best leverage, given the high degree of mutual mistrust and suspicion and the current low level of

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direct transactions. And developments in other areas of the agenda we have defined would lead to improvement or worsening in overall relations no matter what we do in direct interaction.

We see three basic alternatives for U.S. policy towards the bilateral relationship as such, i.e., as distinguished from regional and East-West issues where we should pursue our interests on the merits of individual situations:

1. Maintain the Status Quo, including its Presentational Aspects;
2. Status Quo Plus Small Steps, minor changes to our existing positions in order to reinforce minor Soviet moves and the "two tracks" we wish to pursue vis-a-vis the Soviets: building our strength, and engaging in serious efforts to improve relations on that basis. The purpose would be to reinforce any small evidence of movement and to test the intentions and flexibility of the new leadership -- without offering significant moves on the main arms control and other bilateral issues.
3. Bilateral Activism: Within the framework of our existing approach, announce U.S. initiatives in arms control or other bilateral areas, and perhaps even agree to an early summit as well. The purpose would be to demonstrate forcefully to the U.S. public and our Allies that we are prepared for a substantial improvement in US-Soviet relations, and to encourage further positive Soviet actions.

In keeping with our overall approach, moves under all three options would be so designed as to yield nothing of substance unless the Soviets reciprocated.

The first approach would be the course to follow if the Andropov leadership were simply to maintain the foreign policy line established under Brezhnev, and avoid any substantive or presentational departures. The third approach would be the appropriate course of action if the Andropov regime were to take the offensive either on the substance of the issues, or successfully on the atmospheric.

The second approach is the course that many commentators are pressing for, but would have some important drawbacks. It might be seen as unjustifiably forthcoming in the face of only minor moves by a still largely unimaginative Soviet leadership. A strategy of small steps could risk overly stimulating public and Allied expectations of a "new dawn" in US-Soviet

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relations, yet the gestures themselves would not go far enough either to pressure the Soviets necessarily to move on to major moves or to position us as the clearly more forthcoming party in the relationship. They could also undermine domestic support for our defense buildup.

We will thus have a range of choices and degrees of graduation in our policy responses available to us in the strictly bilateral aspect of the relationship.

One particular area of the agenda will continue to be particularly important, and could be uncommonly active. An active Soviet diplomacy under Andropov is capable of moves in the human rights area that are welcome in terms of our values but troublesome because they are not fundamental. The Soviets could release or improve treatment of more or less well-known dissidents, possibly allowing some to emigrate, under cover of a broader amnesty, in "spy trades," or simply as gestures timed for international impact, as in CSCE. They could make sudden moves to meet our "balance" requirements in CSCE. Or they could make new gestures like the invitation just accepted by the ILO to observe labor conditions in the USSR. Change would not be basic, but each move would be designed to require a "positive response" in view of the importance we attach to the topic.

Beyond the "indirect leverage" we exercise on the USSR's global environment, we have leverage within the relationship to keep our balanced agenda intact. First, we should actively pursue the current approach of exploring areas where we can work with the Soviets to mutual advantage, where our interests overlap, even if such areas are few and small. Non-proliferation is a good example. But it may also be to our advantage over the next two years to move to the point of engaging the negotiations with the USSR on various topics. Second, the issues involved in the question of a summit in a sense subsume many of the issues in US-Soviet relations overall. We discuss both possibilities in the next section.

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